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CIVIL RIGHTS 
Is Discrimination Against] ews "Race Discrimination?" 
by Neal Devins 
Shaare Tefila Congregation 
v. 
John Cobb 
(Docket No. 85-2156) 
Argued February25, 1987 
What is racial discrimination? Is it discrimination 
against members of a racially distinct group, or is it 
discrimination against individuals believed to be mem-
bers of such a group? In other words, should subjective 
intent or taxanomical classifications determine whether 
civil rights laws' protection against "all racially motivated 
deprivations" apply to Jews, Arabs and other ethnic 
Caucasians? This important question will be addressed 
by the Supreme Court in Slzaare Tefila Congregation v. 
Cobb. (In a related case, St. Francis College v. Al-Kizaraji, 
No. 85-2169, also analyzed in this issue of Preview, the 
Court will determine whether these laws protect Arabs.) 
ISSUES 
Specifically, Cobb will determine whether the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 recognizes that discrimination 
against Jews might constitute race discrimination. In 
making this determination, the Court will necessarily 
decide whether the post-Civil War guarantee that "all 
citizens shall have the same rights enjoyed by white 
citizens" is a universalistic demand that discrimination is 
not to be tolerated or whether this protection is limited 
to non-Caucasian interests. Because this issue lies at the 
heart of perceptions about race and discrimination, 
Ar'ab, Jewish and black organizations have joined 
together in arguing that Jews are entitled to protection 
under this statute. While such agreement might make 
resolving this case t!asy from an emoRights Act of 1866 
was enacted to ensure that blacks' right to enjoy the laws' 
protection was equal to that of "white citizens." Many 
courts-including the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
which rejected the Jewish plaintiffs' claim in this case 
(785 E. 2d 523 (1986))-have held that Congress did 
have taxanomical classifications in mind when it enacted 
this statute. 
Neal Devins is an Attorney specializing in civil rights law, 
1121 Vmnont Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20425; tele-
phone (202) 376-8372. 
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FACTS 
On November 2, 1982, the Shaare Tefila Congrega-
tion of Silver Spring, Maryland was desecrated. The 
walls of the synagogue were spraypainted in large anti-
Semitic slogans and symbols-including "Death to the 
Jude," "Dead Jude," swastikas and Ku Klux Klan sym-
bols. Perpetrators of the attack admitted that they per-
ceived Jews to be members of a distinct and inferior 
race. Claiming that·their civil rights were violated, mem-
bers of the Shaare Tefila Congregation filed a claim in 
federal court against the perpetrators-at least eight 
individuals including John Cobb and Michael Remer. 
(Remer was the only original defendant to be active in 
the court of appeals.) 
The original claim was based on 42 U.S.C. section 
1982-part of the 1866 Act-which ensures all citizens 
"the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens to own 
property." The congregation argued that defendants' 
racially-motivated desecration of their synagogue de-
nied them the statutorily-protected right to hold pro-
perty. The United States District Court for Maryland 
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this 
contention. Ruling that "nothing in the statute, its legis-
lative history, or subsequent case law" suggests that this 
statute "was intended to apply to situations in which a 
plaintiff is a member of a racially distinct group," these 
courts summarily dismissed-without need for a trial-
plaintiffs' claim. (These courts also rejected plaintiffs' 42 
U.S.C. section 1981 claim; holding that the right to the 
"full and equal benefit of all laws" is concerned only with 
state-sponsored deprivation of rights. This state action 
holding was not appealed to ihe Supreme Court.) 
Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Court dissented to 
this appellate court holding. For him, the majority's 
taxanomical distinction misunderstood the purposes of 
the Civil Rights Act-namely, "to halt the spread of 
violence and hatred by those mo~ivated by such percep-
tions." judge Wilkinson also sought to support his think-
ing through the commonsense argument that "all racial 
prejudice is the result of subjective, irrational percep-
tions, which drain individuals of their dignity because of 
their perceived equivalence as members of a racial 
group." 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
At its core, Cobb addresses.a question of fundamental 
importance to the ongoing debate-spurred on by the 
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Reagan administration-regarding the definition of civil 
rights. If the congregation prevails, civil rights is an 
umbrella, protecting all against discrimination. If the 
defendants prevail, civil rights has a much narrower 
focus-the protection of taxanomic minorities from the 
dominant white culture. (The Reagan administration, 
which supports reverse discrimination claims of inno· 
cent whites injured by affirmative action plans, supports 
the view that civil rights laws extend to all citizens. How-
ever, the administration did not file an amicus brief in 
this litigation.) 
Cobb also addresses an important statutory interpre· 
tation issue: What is the appropriate point of reference 
for determining statutory purpose? Unlike the current 
debate over the framers' understanding of constitu· 
tiona! provisions, the Congress which enacts a statute 
establishes its meaning. At the same time, just as the 
framers did not anticipate changes in social custom and 
practice, the 1866 Congress might not have anticipated 
changing perceptions of racial identity. In interpreting 
42 U.S.C. section 1982, therefore, the Court must deter· 
mine whether "the rights enjoyed by white citizens" is an 
inherently evolving concept. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, Cobb is socially signifi· 
cant because it has united Arabs, Jews and blacks before 
the Court. 
ARGUMENTS 
For Shaare Tefila Congregation (Counsel of Record, Patricia A. 
Brannan, 815 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 
20006: telephone (202) 33 I -4 500) 
l. The racial motivation and character of the de-
fendants' conduct, not some taxanomic classification, 
define race under 42 U.S.C. section 1982. To hold 
otherwise defeats the purpose of the statute and is 
inconsistent with Supreme Court race discrimination 
jurisprudence. 
For Michael Remer (Counsel of Record, Robert Bamhouse, 
1100 Charles Center South, Baltimore, AID 21201 ,· telepho11e 
(301) 539-2530) 
l. The language and legislative history of section I982, 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, indicate that 
the statute covers discrimination on the basis of 
race-not discrimination based on erroneous percep· 
tions of racial identity. 
2. The congregation's interpretation of section 1982 
would infinitely expand the scope of civil rights laws, 
making those laws unworkable. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of the Shaare Tefila Congregation 
The state of Maryland; the American-Arab Antidis-
crimination Committee: and a coalition of groups in-
cluding the Antidefamation League, the ACLU and the 
NAACP 
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